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Incapacitated: Supported Decision-making 
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Hui Yun Chan
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Abstract
Advance directives (ADs) provide people with the opportunity to express their wishes 
about treatment preferences prior to becoming incapacitated. While the normative 
logic behind ADs remain straightforward, as instruments of law they are not always 
effective because of questions about their validity and applicability. It is on this basis 
that this article attempts to resolve the legal intricacies on ADs refusing treatment prior 
to becoming incapacitated. The author advances a thesis in support of a modification 
of an approach known as supported decision-making to facilitate people in making 
ADs. This approach pre-empts most of the doubts about an AD’s validity. The argument 
is founded on the presumption that an AD made using the supported decision-making 
approach provides a higher degree of assurance about the circumstances surrounding 
the making of ADs, rendering it more likely to be binding on healthcare professionals.
Keywords
advance directives (ADs) − autonomy − supported decision-making − Mental Capacity 
Act (MCA)
 Introduction
On the basis of common law principles, and statutory provisions medical 
practitioners have a duty of care towards patients.1 Thus, it is well within the 
1   See generally Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001).
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purview of the law that, if the patient lacks capacity, then in the absence of 
an advance directive, they must be treated in their best interests.2 While this 
functions strictly as a legal duty, along the same rubrics of law, the right of a 
competent adult to refuse medical treatment, even treatment that keeps one 
alive, is legally preserved.3 What follows this standard is the legal principle 
that a medical intervention without any valid informed consent is an offence 
against that person under the common law and the medical practitioner can 
be incriminated with battery.4
This concept is derived from the common law right of an adult person to 
self-determination and bodily integrity.5 Still, this operates as a default mecha-
nism, and it generally remains the norm, as certain margins of exceptions can 
be found, via the conduits of an advance directive (AD).6 The term “advance 
directive is most commonly used to refer to the anticipatory refusal of medical 
treatment.7 Thus, in theory, a patient can give an advance directive to outline 
the treatments they do not wish to receive. This legal concept is similar to the 
ethical principle of patient autonomy, that a patient has a right to make in-
formed decisions about receiving or refusing medical care.8 To put it simply, an 
AD is a legal document drawn up by individuals when they are well to express 
their wishes as to their future care and medical treatment, when they are no 
longer able to make decisions for themselves because of illness or incapacity.
The logical and legal bases are that a medical practitioner is required to act 
within this AD unless there is evidence that the patient revoked the AD when 
2   Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18.
3   Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789; Re JT (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 
FLR 48; Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] FLR 129; St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust 
v. S [1998] 3 WLR 936 (CA).
4   See for example the case of Malette v. Shulman (1990) 72 OR (2d) 417, where the patient suc-
cessfully sued the doctor for battery for transfusing blood in contravention of an advance 
refusal.
5   A.I. Tauber, ‘Historical and Philosophical Reflections on Patient Autonomy’, Health Care 
Analysis 9 (2001) 299; L. Willmott, B. White and B. Mathews, ‘Law, Autonomy and Advance 
Directives’, Journal of Law and Medicine (18) 2010 366; I. Kerridge, C. Lowe and C. Stewart 
(eds.), Ethics and Law for the Health Professions (4th ed, The Federation Press, NSW, 2013).
6   Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18.
7   P. Lack, N. Biller-Andorno and S. Brauer (eds.), Advance Directives (Dordrecht, Springer, 2014) 
p. 75; see also Megan-Jane Johnstone, Bioethics: A Nursing Perspective (6th edn., Elsevier, 
Sydney, 2016) p. 224.
8   Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; Re MB (Adult, medical treatment) [1997] 38 BMLR 175 CA; 
Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; see also AMA Code of Medical 
Ethics, Opinion 10.01.
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still competent. An advance directive does not necessarily apply to all situa-
tions, and whether the patient’s current condition is covered or still applicable 
by his directive has to be checked.9 This follows the conceptual understanding 
that when an adult becomes incapacitated he loses the right to decide on his 
medical care. Thus, the validity of ADs, one aspect of it, somehow depends on 
the notion of “capacity, which finds its authentic expression in Section 2 of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).10 However, capacity as a concept discussed 
in empirical literature is not free from theoretical controversies.11 This is gen-
erally compounded by the theory of least restrictive intervention, which runs 
parallel to the conceptual belief that anything done for or on behalf of people 
without capacity should be the least restrictive, in line with their basic rights 
and freedoms.12
The framework of Section 4(6)(a) of the MCA is explicitly clear on this. The 
analytical view of this substantive provision plainly states that when determin-
ing a person’s best interests when that person lacks capacity, any written state-
ment made when they had capacity should be considered. Remarkably, the 
preparatory work towards the MCA can be drawn upon to dismantle the tenac-
ity of this concept in legal sense. It is significant that the deliberations by the 
Law Commission provide us with a solid framework in understanding the legal 
conundrum of capacity. The Commission had advanced a proposition for the 
British government to accept a “functional approach in determining whether a 
person has the capacity to make a particular decision.13 This approach, which 
provides a solid legal foundation of capacity focuses on whether the individual 
is able to make a decision at the time when it has to be made.
In the orthodox sense, ADs were designed to contain enriched content to 
assist individuals and their appointed agents, families, and physicians to better 
9    W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H and others [2004] EWCA Civ 1324; HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust 
& AE (by her litigation friend the Official Solicitor) [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam).
10   Chapter 9, entered into force.
11   See for example, R.J. Leo, ‘Competency and the Capacity to Make Treatment Decisions: A 
Primer for Primary Care Physicians’, J Clin Psychiatry 1(5) (1999) 131; A. Mogg and A. Bartlett, 
‘Refusal of treatment in a patient with fluctuating capacity — theory and practice’, The 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology 16(1)(2005) 60-69; S. Mukherjee and A. Shah, 
‘Capacity to consent: issues and controversies’, Hospital Medicine 62(6) (2013) 351.
12   One of the core principles in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Part I.
13   Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (London: HMSO, 1995), (Consultation paper no 231.); 
Lord Chancellor’s Department. Who Decides? Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally 
Incapacitated Adults: A Consultation Paper (London: HMSO, 1997); Lord High Chancellor. 
Making Decisions: The Government’s Proposals for Making Decisions on Behalf of Mentally 
Incapacitated Adults (London: The Stationery Office, 1999) (Cmnd 4465.).
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understand and honour their wishes, and this was in response to the increasing 
sophistication and prevalence of medical technology.14 The philosophical as-
pects of an AD are a notion well-founded in the empirical literature. Moreover, 
the legal system of many civilised countries has been receptive to the idea of 
AD, except that although an AD is binding under common law, the legal status 
is often not a settled one under statute law. For instance, in the United States 
(USA) it has a legal status,15 while several European jurisdictions, Canada, 
Australia and Singapore have also granted specific ADs legally binding status 
in their respective statutes.16
In fairness and bent on protecting justified expectation, Parliament in-
tended to allow patients to express their wishes before they become incapaci-
tated, and this resulted in the introduction of the MCA in 2005.17 This statute, 
which governs the legal field of ADs is applicable in England and Wales. Built 
around six overriding principles, the MCA gives advance decisions refusing 
treatment a legally binding status and advance statements of persuasive au-
thority. Prior to the inception of the MCA into the legal landscape of England 
and Wales, common law jurisprudence had developed gradually in this field, 
providing some guidance to the legal status of ADs. Common law dictates that 
14   J. Childress, ‘Dying Patients. Who’s in Control?’, Law, Medicine & Health Care 17(3) (1989) 
227-228.
15   Patient Self Determination Act in 1990 (Federal Law); Uniform Health Care Decisions 
Act 1993; the 50 states in the USA regulate advance directives according to their respective 
set of laws.
16   Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation CM/Rec (2009)11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on principles continuing powers of attorney and advance directives for 
incapacity’, Eur J Health Law 17(2010)205-210; R. Andorno, N. Biller-Andorno and S. Brauer, 
‘Advance health care directives: towards a coordinated European policy?’, Eur J Health 
Law 16 (2009) 207-227; Advance Medical Directives Act 1996 (Sg), Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (UK), ss 24-26; Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA); Medical Treatment 
Act 1994 (ACT); Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 and Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Advance 
Care Directives Act 2013 (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA); Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Advance Personal Planning Act 2013 (NT), Health Care 
(Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act RSBC 1996 c 181; Personal Directives Act 2000 
RSA c P-6, Advance Health Care Directives Act 1995 SNL c A-4.1; Personal Directives Act 
2005 SNWT c 16; Personal Directives Act 2008 SNSc 8; Consent to Treatment and Health 
Care Directives Act 1988 PEI c C-17.2; An Act respecting end-of-life care Bill 2014 (52) c 2 
(Quebec); the Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act 
1997 S c H-0.001; the Health Care Directives Act 1992 CCSM c H27; Health Care Consent 
Act 1996 SO c2.
17   Chapter 9, entered into force.
-1
0
 1X
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40X
41
42
43
EJHL_024_05-Chan.indd   4 08/05/2017   10:32:28 AM
5ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING
european Journal of health law 24 (2017) 1-19
individuals possess autonomy and self-determination, which encompass the 
right to accept or refuse medical treatment.18
By its construction, the MCA does not render the legal position of common 
law legitimately defective, however, it only adds certainty to the cardinal prin-
ciples of the law. Thus, the common law has now been refined by the MCA, 
which has clarified the common law principles of rights to bodily integrity and 
of autonomy of people who are temporarily or permanently incapacitated by 
accident, disease or some other events. Now, our legal system endorses the 
principle that all persons are competent to make reasoned decisions unless 
demonstrated to be otherwise. Therefore, in England and Wales people may 
make an AD or appoint a proxy under the MCA. This legislation provides a stat-
utory benchmark, a basis for advance decisions to refuse treatment.
Under the aegis of the law, an AD that was made when the patient was men-
tally competent, acted voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature 
and consequences of the refusal would be upheld. The MCA also provides that 
an AD can be overridden if the person is subject to compulsory treatment 
under the Mental Health Act 1983,19 and this is generally the problem under 
the so-called presumption of capacity in section 2(1) of the MCA.
Notably, the statute distinguished legally binding ADs from advance state-
ments, with specific requirements for ADs in sections 24 to 26 that have to be 
complied with in order to be valid and legally binding.20 As a general mat-
ter, the MCA has a companion Code of Practice (COP) aimed at assisting the 
healthcare practitioners and anyone implementing the law. It provides a num-
ber of safeguards to ensure that ADs are not misused, for example, allowing a 
medical practitioner to exercise an unreasonable clinical judgement to treat 
patients, if there is uncertainty about the directive.21
Within this spirit, the COP has full statutory force, and adds to the guid-
ance in the main MCA, which means that certain people are under a legal 
duty to have regard to them including people exercising functions relating to 
the deprivation of liberty safeguards, and people acting as a relevant person’s 
representative22 under the deprivation of liberty safeguards.
18   See for example the affirmation of right to bodily integrity and self-determination in 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 105 NE 92 (NY 1914) that was widely endorsed 
in the Commonwealth jurisdiction.
19   Chapter 20. Part II.
20   Section 25(5) Mental Capacity Act 2005.
21   Under sections 42 and 43.
22   A ‘relevant person’ is a person who is, or may become, deprived of their liberty in accor-
dance with the deprivation of liberty safeguards.
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As a matter of empirical logic, ADs were advocated as valuable tools to pro-
tect the right to make decisions.23 This notwithstanding, there were critiques 
about its effectiveness when the person became incapacitated.24 In the narra-
tive several empirical studies and cases have turned on the light about the inef-
fectiveness of ADs, which are largely attributed to the inability of the persons 
having to give effect to the ADs, to verify whether the AD still represents the 
wishes of the person.
These concerns tie in with questions about its validity, in particular, the 
theoretical controversy about whether the person was mentally capacitated 
when it was made, whether the person was acting voluntarily, whether the per-
son knew what the person was refusing, and whether any subsequent changes 
had occurred that would affect the person’s prior wishes.25 There was also the 
problem of applying the mechanics of ADs itself. The contradiction is that if 
the contents were vague or imprecise, or fell outside the scope of the AD, the 
AD would be inapplicable,26 making the law often the refuge of last resort, pro-
viding unsatisfactory results.
So, although the legal logic behind ADs is to provide people with the op-
portunity to express their wishes in relation to treatment preferences prior to 
23   L. Kutner, ‘The Living Will: Coping with the Historical Event of Death’, Baylor L Rev 
27( 1975) 39-53 pp. 27, 39; L. Kutner, ‘Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will: A 
Proposal’, ND LJ 44 (1968-1969) 539-554; M.J. Silveira, S.Y. Kim & K.M. Langa, ‘Advance di-
rectives and outcomes of surrogate decision-making before death’, N Engl J Med 362 (2010) 
1211-1218 (an investigative study which supported the continued use of advance directives 
in elderly patients who had prepared advance directives received care that was strongly 
associated with their preferences); N.L. Cantor, ‘Advance Directive Instruments for End-
of-Life and Health Care Decision Making: Making Advance Directives Meaningful’, Psych 
Pub Pol and L 4 (1998) 629-652; D. Shoemaker, ‘The Insignificance of Personal Identity for 
Bioethics’, Bioethics 24 (2010) 481-489.
24   Some examples are A. Fagerlin and C. Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living 
Will’, Hastings Center Report 34 (2004) 30-42; H.S. Perkins, ‘Controlling Death: The False 
Promise of Advance Directives’, Annals of Intern. Med. 147 (2007) 51-57; C.J. Ryan, ‘Betting 
your life: an argument against certain advance directives’, JME 22 (1996) 95-99; C. Hertogh, 
‘The Misleading Simplicity of Advance Directive’, International Psychogeriatrics23 (2011) 
511-515; J.A. Devereux, Australian Medical Law (Routledge Cavendish, London, 2007) pp. 
933-938.
25   For example, Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18; HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust & AE [2003] EWHC 
1017 (Fam); NHS Trust v. T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 
(Fam); Re C (refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 (Fam); Re AK (Adult Patient)
(Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129, [2000] 58 BMLR 151; HE v. A Hospital NHS 
Trust & AE [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam).
26   For example, the case of W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H and others [2004] EWCA Civ 1324.
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becoming incapacitated, as an instrument of law an AD is not always going to 
be effective because of questions about its validity and applicability. These is-
sues give rise to matters of general principle of law, and we learn immediately 
that key conflicting questions, such as, under what circumstances it was made 
or whether it still represents the person’s wishes remain commonly an unre-
solved matter.
It is on this basis that this paper attempts to resolve the legal intricacies 
on advance directives pursuant to refusing treatment prior to becoming in-
capacitated. The author advances a thesis in support of a modification of an 
approach known as supported decision-making to facilitate people in mak-
ing advance directives. This approach pre-empts most of the doubts about the 
validity of an advance directive, for example the person’s mental capacity or 
understanding at the time the advance directive was made. The argument is 
founded on the premise that an advance directive made using the supported 
decision-making approach provides a higher degree of assurance about the 
circumstances surrounding the making of advance directives, rendering it 
more likely to be binding on healthcare professionals.
 Refusing Treatment Prior to Becoming Incapacitated and the 
Importance of Getting an AD Right: Case Law Approach
As emerged above, the right of an adult patient to consent to receiving or not 
to receive medical treatment has long been recognised by common law, the 
courts and statutes. Many countries have legal provisions supporting the right 
of adult patients to refuse care and to provide directives about end-of-life care 
when the patient can no longer make decisions for himself or herself. The US 
Supreme Court has recognised that the due process clause of the Constitution 
gives competent adults an interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.27
The provisions relating to the existence, validity and applicability of ad-
vance decisions, and especially those relating to life-sustaining treatment, are 
some of the most important ones in the MCA. Notwithstanding the legal pos-
sibilities, the practical application of ADs can be difficult, and mostly their dif-
ficulty can be seen from some disputes brought before the courts to challenge 
the validity and applicability of the ADs. In other words, the importance of 
getting an AD right has only been emphasised in a series of cases where ADs’ 
validity were the subject of legal test.
27   Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 [1990].
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 The Case of the Patient Whose Feeding Tube Fell Out
W NHS Trust v. H and others28 is an example that illustrates a common scenar-
io in oral ADs; two people discussing nonchalantly what they would not want 
to happen to them when they become too ill or disabled; then one of them fell 
ill and a decision must be made about treatment withdrawal. There seems to 
be a prior expression of wishes but how much weight should be given to it? Is 
it clear enough? Does the person know what it means? These questions will 
become important when the oral AD is called into implementation.
The patient in question, Ms KH, suffered from multiple sclerosis. She was a 
resident in a nursing home that provided her with 24-hour care. KH was fully 
dependent on the nursing home for her survival because her ‘bodily functions 
ha[d] ceased to work’.29 A consultant physician, consultant psychiatrist and 
KH’s family agreed that she was incapable of consenting to treatment.30 She 
was fed through a feeding tube. When the tube fell out she was hospitalised. 
The patient’s family opposed the reinsertion of the feeding tube. It was then 
that the hospital applied to the Court to reinsert the feeding tube in her best 
interest on the basis that KH lacked the capacity to decide.
Exercising its discretion, the Court granted the declaration on the basis that 
there was no clearly expressed AD refusing treatment from when she had been 
competent. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision upon ap-
peal by KH’s daughter and brother. This case demonstrates that unless there is 
a clear and applicable declaration of refusal, then the AD would not bind the 
doctors.31 The Court declined KH’s purported wishes because:32
(a) the conversations had occurred many years ago, almost certainly all 
took place before [she] was admitted to the home in 1994;
(b)  none of them dealt specifically with the withdrawal of feeding;
(c)  there were no medically qualified witnesses who had discussed the 
ramifications of slowly starving to death over a two-to-three-week 
period with her;
(d)  there is no suggestion adduced from the evidence that [her] alleged 
comments were the result of a considered and balanced decision 
taken after full consideration of all relevant matters.
28   W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H and others [2004] EWCA Civ 1324.
29   Ibid., 835.
30   Ibid., 836.
31   Ibid., 838.
32   Ibid., 839.
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The example above illuminates the importance of the decision-making pro-
cess in creating ADs. The majority of the courts’ concerns in AD disputes33 fo-
cused on four issues: first, whether the patient had mental capacity at the time 
the AD was made; second, whether the patient had understood the nature and 
consequences of the refusal, based on the types of information available, third, 
what the AD meant in the circumstances that had arisen and fourth, whether 
the AD still represented the patient’s wishes.
This sets the foundation to suggest ways to improve the decision-making 
process in AD so that when it comes to the implementation stage, there is less 
likelihood of the veracity of the AD being questioned on one of the grounds de-
scribed above. The supported decision-making approach is an approach that 
potentially facilitates KH to make ADs that are more likely to be accepted as 
binding.34 This approach, its application and some limitations will be explored 
in the following sections.
 The Supported Decision-making Approach
There seems to be a lack of universal definition of supported decision-making.35 
It has been defined as ‘an approach to decision-making that involves provid-
ing a person with impaired capacity the support they need to make their own 
decision’36 or ‘a framework within which a person with a disability can be as-
sisted to make valid decisions, [where] [t]he key concepts are empowerment, 
choice and control’.37 Another conception of supported decision-making is a 
33   See for example Re T [1992] EWCA Civ 18; HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust & AE [2003] EWHC 
1017 (Fam); NHS Trust v. T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 
(Fam); Re C (refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290 (Fam); Re AK (Adult Patient)
(Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129; [2000] 58 BMLR 151.
34   United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability. Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, online at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.
asp?id=150, retrieved 11 June 2015.
35   M. McGuire, ‘Supported Decision-making forum: Summary report’ (Office of the Public 
Advocate, 24 February 2010) 4; see also Office of the Public Advocate Systems, ‘Advocacy, 
A journey towards autonomy? Supported decision-making in theory and practice: A 
review of literature’ (February 2014) 26; T. Carney, ‘Clarifying, Operationalising, and 
Evaluating Supported Decision Making Models’, Research and Practice in Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities 1 (2014) 46-50.
36   Victorian Law Reform Commission. Guardianship Final Report, 30 June 2011; 24: xviii.
37   B. Carter, ‘Supported decision-making: Background and discussion paper’ (Office of the 
Public Advocate, Melbourne, 2009) p. 9; G. Davidson, ‘Supported and Substitute Decision 
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series of formal or informal arrangements intended to support a person ‘make 
and communicate to others decisions about the individual’s life’.38 Supported 
decision-making is, in its broadest sense, a mechanism providing support to 
persons requiring assistance in effecting their rights to legal capacity and com-
municating their wishes.39
A further dimension is added to our conception of whether there is a uni-
versal definition or not, the central idea for supported decision-making is 
helping people achieve the ability to express or decide autonomously with the 
appropriate support suitable for them, guided by the goal to empower them. 
Supported decision-making in the context of ADs refers to providing assistance 
to people in expressing their wishes through ADs, consistent with their beliefs.
The supported decision-making approach was popularised by an interna-
tional instrument, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disability (UNCRPD), adopted on 13 December 2006 and came into force on 
3 May 2008.40 The UNCRPD is meant to address the human rights of persons 
with disabilities, encompassing physical and mental disabilities with reference 
to ways to facilitate or accommodate disabled persons’ social development, 
exercise and enjoyment of rights, which includes importantly, protecting 
self-determination.41
Its goal is broadly based on the premise that disabled persons should not 
be excluded from deciding for themselves. The vision of the UNCRPD is to cul-
tivate a paradigm shift from viewing the disabled as “objects of charities to 
“subjects with rights.42 In realising this vision, the UNCRPD adopted a func-
tional concept for supported decision-making, where the aim is to support 
Making under Mental Capacity Legislation: A Review of the International Evidence’, 
Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series (Queens University Belfast and Northern Ireland 
Assembly) p. 2.
38   Ibid.
39   United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability. Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, online at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default 
.asp?id=150, retrieved 11 June 2015.
40   Ibid.
41   Ibid. Article 1 of the Convention provides that its purpose is “to promote, protect and 
ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all 
persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity: N. Caivano, 
‘Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada’s Qualified Ratification of Article 12 of 
the UN Disability Rights Convention’, Western Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2014) 14-23.
42   United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability. Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, online at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.
asp?id=150, retrieved 11 June 2015.
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the person in exercising their autonomy to decide. This functional concept in-
cludes, for example, inquiring into the level of support needed by the person to 
express their wishes.43 This then entails gathering information and explaining 
the issues impacting the person’s decision-making, interpreting the person’s 
wishes44 and assisting them with communicating their wishes or acting on 
their instructions to the extent possible.45
The broad framework of the UNCRPD has been interpreted in the context 
of law by reference to reforming guardianship laws for persons with disability, 
acknowledging that every person, including the incapacitated, possess human 
rights.46 Although the UNCRPD is a framework that specifically addresses per-
sons with disabilities, Amita Dhanda argued that it ought to be construed in 
a broader sense as part of the human rights framework which could be ap-
plicable to medical and health matters for people with cognitive disability, so-
cial care and welfare to personal decisions, guardianship matters and living 
arrangements for the disabled.47 This observation is correct in the sense that it 
can include people who are incompetent temporarily due to physical or men-
tal disorder. Support can be provided to restore the person’s decision-making 
capacity. The extent to which support can be effective for severely demented 
people wishing to make ADs, however, may be put to the test.48
It would therefore, appear self-evident, that although recent research on 
supported decision-making has primarily focused on supporting people with 
intellectual disability or cognitive disability in expressing their preferences in 
43   Australia Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 81, ‘Equality, Capacity and Disability 
in Commonwealth Laws’ (May 2014) p. 77.
44   Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), Handbook for Parliamentarians 
on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Optional Protocol N 14 — 
2007 from Exclusion to Equality: Realizing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United 
Nations, New York) 89, 90.
45   M. McGuire, ‘Supported Decision-making forum: Summary report’ (Office of the Public 
Advocate, 24 February 2010) 4.
46   Reform for these laws occurred in many jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand.
47   A. Dhanda, ‘Constructing A New Human Rights Lexicon: Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’, SUR — Int’l J on Hum Rts 8 (2008) 44-58.
48   This is also true for people with intellectual disability seeking to express personal prefer-
ences. See N. Kohn, J. Blumenthal and A. Campbell, ‘Supported Decision-Making: A Viable 
Alternative to Guardianship?’, Penn State Law Review 117 (2013) 1111-1157, at pp. 1111-1114, 
1128; N. Kohn and J. Blumenthal, ‘A critical assessment of supported decision-making for 
persons aging with intellectual disabilities’, Disability and Health Journal 7 (2014) S40-S43.
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decisions affecting their lives,49 the central idea of supported decision-making 
can be equally applicable to competent people who need assistance in mak-
ing informed decisions. After all, human beings interact and receive support 
in various forms in their everyday decision-making, in all aspects of their life,50 
for example, making purchasing or investment decisions, considering which 
gym membership to subscribe to or clubs to join, or deciding where to relocate. 
A mentally competent and a physically disabled person can make these deci-
sions. The difference then lies in the nature of the subject matter, the support 
necessary to effectuate that decision, as well as the ability to change his or 
her mind after the decisions come into effect. The more complex the subject 
matter is, the more support is required to facilitate that decision-making pro-
cess. Supported decision-making requires external positive actions or support 
person to accommodate the person’s needs to achieve the ability to exercise 
49   M. Bach and L. Kerzner, ‘A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
Capacity’ (Law Commission of Ontario, October 2010); S. Pathare and L. Shields, ‘Supported 
Decision-Making for Persons with Mental Illness: A Review’, Public Health Reviews 34 
(2012) 1-40; Advocacy for Inclusion, ‘Supported Decision Making, Legal Capacity and 
Guardianship: Implementing Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in the Australian Capital Territory (August 2012; Amnesty International, 2011); 
Capacity, Supported Decision Making, Advance Directives and Substitute Decision Making: 
The Right to Equal Recognition Before the Law — Legal Capacity, Amnesty International 
Ireland; M. Wallace, Evaluation of the Supported Decision Making Project, Office of the 
Public Advocat,. November 2012; T. Carney, ‘Supported Decision-Making for People with 
Cognitive Impairments: An Australian Perspective?’, Laws 4 (2015) 37-59; A. Arstein-
Kerslake, ‘An empowering dependency: exploring support for the exercise of legal capac-
ity’, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 18 (2014) 1-16; J. Craigie, ‘A Fine Balance: 
Reconsidering Patient Autonomy In Light of the UN Convention On The Rights Of Persons 
With Disabilities’, Bioethics 29 (2015) 398-405; M. Browning, C. Bigby and J. Douglas, 
‘Supported Decision Making: Understanding How its Conceptual Link to Legal Capacity 
is Influencing the Development of Practice’, Research and Practice in Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities 1 (2014) 34-45; J. ten Broek, ‘The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Toward a New International Politics of Disability’, 
Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 15 (2009) 33-52; N. Devi, ‘Supported Decision-
Making and Personal Autonomy for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, Journal of Law, Medicine & 
Ethics 41 (2013) 792-806; T. Carney, ‘Clarifying, Operationalising, and Evaluating Supported 
Decision Making Models’, Research and Practice in Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities 1 (2014) 46-50, at p. 49; N. Kohn, J. Blumenthal and A. Campbell, ‘Supported 
Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship? Penn State Law Review 117 (2013) 
1111-1157, at pp. 1113-1114, 1154.
50   A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘An empowering dependency: exploring support for the exercise of 
legal capacity’, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 18 (2014) 1-16.
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autonomy and realise the right to decide. Human dignity as empowerment is 
a notion that is consistent with the historical developments of autonomy, in 
which the control in medical decision-making is shifted from the authoritative 
hands of doctors, which is paternalistic, towards patients.51 The next section 
considers more fully the application of supported decision-making to ADs.
 Applying the Supported Decision-making Approach to AD
From the perspective of people who are currently competent, supported deci-
sion-making helps them to anticipate and avoid the sorts of problems that ADs 
sometimes encounter. For example, although an able-bodied competent per-
son does not face the obstacles of a physically disabled or mentally impaired 
person in completing a physical or mental task, the person can benefit from 
consultations with the doctors about treatment refusal risks and options. As 
such, the disability here does not refer to the person strictly, or at the time the 
person makes the AD, but to the future when the person has lost competence. 
The “disability in the context of a competent person refers to the inability to 
fully anticipate the changes that can potentially occur after making an AD or 
appreciating the potential risks of a preferred treatment option, thus requir-
ing support in the form of understanding those risks and options. Supported 
decision-making strives to address this weakness by providing the support 
necessary to comprehend the complexity of the decision and reducing some 
practical obstacles towards achieving a person’s expression of autonomous 
wishes, resulting in a greater likelihood of the AD being legally binding and the 
person’s wishes being respected.
This approach thus enables the person to retain the power as the 
decision-maker,52 enhancing rather than diminishing a person’s autonomy.53 
Supported decision-making is a more nuanced approach because it recognizes 
the support needed to achieve that autonomy to make a decision and does not 
preclude the existence of networks of people in helping the person express 
his or her preferences (although distinguishing overbearing influence is a fine 
balancing act). There is no reason why this concept cannot be applied in the 
51   Empowerment is based on the intrinsic human dignity idea, and the freedom entitled 
to everyone, which respects personal autonomy; see B. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, 
Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993).
52   R. Dinerstein, ‘Implementing Legal Capacity under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported 
Decision-Making’, Hum Rts Brief 19 (2011-2012) 8-12.
53   A. Dhanda, ‘Constructing A New Human Rights Lexicon: Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’, SUR — Int’l J on Hum Rts 8 (2008) 44-58, at pp. 44, 48 and 50.
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context of people seeking to make a choice about refusing future treatments 
and necessitating the support given to the people to exercise that choice. 
The difference lies in the level of disability when the person sought to make 
a decision.
Some proposals have been made in respect of the supported decision-
making model. For example, Leslie Salzman noted four attributes of supported 
decision-making — the person maintains the legal right to decide despite the 
appointment of a supporter; the person can freely enter into or decide to ter-
minate the relationship; the person participates actively in making decisions 
and the decisions arrived at are generally legally binding.54 These qualities re-
flected upon the importance of ensuring that the supported person retains the 
ultimate right to decide. Additionally, it may be prudent to establish ‘guide-
lines’ in navigating the relationship between the person who is supported and 
the network of supporters in the supported decision-making model. Anna 
Arstein-Kerslake has proposed four principles towards protecting the sup-
ported decision-making relationship — respecting the supported person and 
the supporters as persons with full moral and legal capacity; acknowledging 
that while there exists an inequality of powers between the two parties, the 
parties must refrain from exploiting upon such inequality; ascertaining that 
the supported person is the ultimate decision-maker expressing his or her own 
genuine preferences and calling for a less intrusive regulation concerning the 
affairs of the supported person.55
Bearing these attributes in mind how does supported decision-making look 
in the context of ADs? The approach is particularly valuable at the time when 
the patient is formulating and setting down their wishes. Supported decision-
making employed at the time the AD was made could address the concerns 
raised about the patient’s mental capacity and understanding of the conse-
quences of the treatment refusal. In a contemporaneous refusal, capacity, even 
if not presumed, can be examined simultaneously. This is not possible in an 
AD. As such, supported decision-making provides the opportunity for a person 
to be seen or have his or her capacity to be assessed by a doctor, or referred to 
an appropriate specialist for such assessments. Secondly, the discussions that 
occur in the consultation include providing relevant information to the person 
about the treatment refused. Such discussion can enlighten the person about 
the nature and consequences of their refusal and the possibility that changes 
54   L. Salzman, ‘Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness — A Legal and Appropriate 
Alternative?’, St Louis U J Health L &Pol’y 4 (2010-2011) 279-329.
55   A. Arstein-Kerslake, ‘An empowering dependency: exploring support for the exercise of 
legal capacity’, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 18 (2014) 1-16, at p.12.
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in their personal circumstances, that may or may not lead to changes of mind, 
may occur. Thirdly, the impact of the changes in circumstances should then be 
emphasised to the patient, that there is a real possibility that these changes in 
the personal circumstances may eventuate and to appreciate that the AD then 
needs to cater to these possibilities, or at least to recognise that the AD may 
afford no opportunity for a change of mind or a reflection of changed circum-
stances when the person becomes incompetent.
There will be a range of people who will be involved in the process, accord-
ing to the needs of the particular circumstances, such as healthcare profes-
sionals, lawyers, social or mental health workers or specialists. This postulates 
an involvement of a multidisciplinary team or in certain cases individuals 
preferred by the patient. Involving a doctor in this process could be helpful 
because a doctor is in a position to explain to the patient that circumstances 
may change when the AD is sought to be implemented, or having the benefit of 
creating an AD that avoids overly vague or general expressions that would be 
difficult to interpret. The use of a support person at the time of making the AD 
can be helpful at the time of implementation. For example, family members 
would be able to confirm the wishes of the respective patients when they were 
involved in the AD making process. Besides allowing them to have a better un-
derstanding of the patients’ decisions, they can provide information to ques-
tions raised about the personal circumstances of the patients that might be 
relevant to implementing the AD and whether any subsequent changes have 
arisen that would affect the AD. Families may be able to help in explaining the 
information in a way that can be easily understood by the patient, or to provide 
emotional and psychological support. Fourthly, through the discussion, the 
person can consider the possibility of nominating a substitute decision-maker 
or a trusted person to deal with the implementation of the AD in the event of 
conflict between family members.
There is reason to suggest that supported decision-making may have al-
ready been recommended in AD practices. Section 4(4) of the MCA amplified 
the premise that the person is encouraged to participate fully in the decision-
making process, or be provided with such assistance towards improving the 
capacity to participate in the process. Patients are encouraged to seek support 
from their doctors and healthcare professionals in making ADs.56 For example, 
56   Some examples include Royal Australasian College of Physicians RACP Submission: Draft 
Advance Care Directive DIY Kit (March 2014) 2 where the RACP favoured the involve-
ment of doctors and carers in helping patients and families understand and complete 
AD forms. Other healthcare organisations recommending doctors’ involvement include: 
New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner. 2009. Advance Directives in Mental 
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the Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice recommended seeking a doctor’s ad-
vice in preparing to make the AD.57 Additionally, it recommends people want-
ing to make ADs to seek advice from doctors, people who are closely involved 
in their care or organisations that can specifically advise them for particular 
conditions.58 Such discussions should be recorded in the patient’s medical 
records.59 Healthcare professionals recognize that making decisions to refuse 
future treatment have serious implications and patients need the necessary 
support in expressing their preferences that would govern their treatment 
when they become incompetent.
 Illustrations of the Supported Decision-making Approach to 
Advance Directives
In this section I revisit the problematic case identified above and consider how 
supported decision-making earlier in the process might have helped to avoid 
the problems that arose. Earlier, I identified the case of KH where her AD was 
declined. This type of AD is made by persons who are healthy but intended 
their ADs to govern their treatment in case they become incompetent in the fu-
ture. The problems that occurred with their ADs arose when they were sought 
to be implemented. The AD was often made some time before the patient be-
came unwell.
KH was the patient whose feeding tube had fallen out. The hospital wanted 
to reinsert the feeding tube, but her family opposed it. Her family’s opposition 
arose from statements that KH had previously expressed that she would not 
want to live in her current circumstances. For example, KH’s other daughter, 
Health Care and Treatment, online at http://www.hdc.org.nz/publications/resources-to-
order/leaflets-and-posters-for-download/advance-directives-in-mental-health-care-and-
treatment-(leaflet), retrieved 9 June 2016; American Medical Association, 2016, Advance 
Care Directives, online at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/ 
medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-resource-center/end-of-life-care/advance-
care-directives.page?, retrieved 9 June 2016; ABA Commission on Law and Aging. 2016, 
Myths and Facts about Health Care Advance Directives, online at http://www.americanbar 
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/2011/2011_aging_bk_myths_factshcad 
.authcheckdam.pdf, retrieved 12 March 2016; NZMA Member Advisory Information Sheet, 
Advance directive: information and sample form, https://www.nzma.org.nz/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0016/17008/AdvanceDirectives.pdf, retrieved 8 June 2016; B. Pace, 
‘Decisions about End-of-Life Care’, JAMA 284(2000)2550; B. Pace, ‘Advance Directives for 
End-of-Life Medical Decisions’, JAMA 283(2000)1518.
57   MCA 2005 Code of Practice (The Stationery Office, UK, 2007) para. [9.14].
58   Mental Capacity Code of Practice para [9.14].
59   Ibid.
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T who had cared for her mother before she left for the nursing home, recalled 
a conversation with her mother while putting her to bed in which her mother 
said: ‘I don’t want to be kept alive by machines’.60 KH’s brother reported that 
he was doubtful whether KH knew what she was saying.61 Mrs N, a long-time 
friend of KH, recalled KH making similar comments to her when they discussed 
death, and that KH wanted nothing but the best quality of life.62 According to 
Mrs N, KH had repeatedly informed her that she would never be a burden 
to her daughters if she could not look after herself.63 KH further emphasised 
that if she failed to recognise her own daughters she would not want to be kept 
alive.64 When KH was first fitted with the feeding tube, T had disagreed with 
it, an opinion that was consistent with the feelings of the rest of the family 
members. Despite this evidence, the court ordered the reinsertion of the feed-
ing tube, because there was no clearly expressed AD refusing treatment in her 
current circumstances. Her previous wishes were expressed in a conversation 
many years ago prior to her becoming incompetent, but were not addressed 
to withdrawing feeding. The court did not think that she had appreciated the 
nature and consequences of the refusal, as a person would if the person had 
discussed the refusal with a healthcare professional. As a whole, the court was 
unconvinced that KH knew what she was refusing.
How would the supported decision-making approach help KH? KH knew 
about her multiple sclerosis diagnosis, but it was not known from the case 
what information she had about the progression of her disease and the treat-
ment and care she could be given to assist her to avoid her becoming a burden 
on her family. If KH did not know about the information regarding the progres-
sion of her disease, the supported decision-making approach could help her by 
having multiple sclerosis specialists advise her about what exactly the disease 
entailed to enable her to prepare for her future care. She could also arrive at an 
understanding of what stage she was at when she was first diagnosed and how 
much time she had before she became incompetent. This information would 
allow her to assess and deliberate on her preferences and what constitutes a 
burden to her family.
Understanding the disease is only one aspect of being informed about med-
ical prognosis. Having considered the medical situation, what information did 
she have about the effect that refusing water and food would have on her? At 
60   W Healthcare NHS Trust v. H and others [2004] EWCA Civ 1324 at 836.
61   Ibid.
62   Ibid., 837.
63   Ibid.
64   Ibid.
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what point did she anticipate that refusal would become operative? The facts 
did not reveal that she had been aware of such information, although through 
her conversation with her close friend and neighbour it was known that she 
only wanted the best quality of life. In this aspect, information about the ef-
fect of refusing water and food are best explained by a medical professional. 
Supported decision-making could help through consultation with her doctor 
when she knew about the diagnosis and what treatment or palliative options 
were available to patients like her. It would be similar to a contemporaneous 
clinical consultation between a doctor and a patient about treatment options 
and the effect of choosing one option over the other. She would have made the 
AD in anticipation of her degeneration due to the multiple sclerosis, and not 
some refusal based on hypothetical facts or conjectures.
Similarly, where there was doubt about her mental capacity at the time she 
purportedly expressed her refusal, she could have had her mental capacity as-
sessed by a qualified professional. The capacity assessment relates to whether 
as multiple sclerosis patient, she understood the nature and consequences of 
her refusal. Equally, the approach could help KH at the time she made the AD 
through a doctor’s observation of any signs of undue influence when KH ex-
pressed her refusal. Where such influence is identified, there is a chance to 
remove such influence, thereby assisting her to make a valid AD. In a contem-
poraneous treatment refusal, the decision could be confirmed with the patient 
simultaneously. However, in an AD, this would mean requiring KH to under-
stand that she would still voluntarily assume the risk of refusing treatment. 
This approach could also assist KH in terms of anticipating and accommodat-
ing subsequent changes in her personal circumstances that would likely im-
pact her decision. For instance, where there are any changes to her medical 
diagnosis, she could, while competent, make a statement to the effect that her 
family’s evidence would be preferred (although this would be open to whether 
it would be accepted), or to appoint them as attorneys under a power of at-
torney or as substitute decision maker. She could also nominate her family or 
close friend as the support person who would be able to confirm her wishes 
when her AD is being implemented.
 Conclusion
Advance directives provide the opportunity for people to express their wishes 
regarding their treatment preferences prior to becoming incapacitated, a notion 
that corresponds with the ethical principle of autonomy. Its application mean-
while is often controversial. Within the scope of this paper, I have attempted 
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to articulate the principal complexities of creating and implementing advance 
directives and argued for the introduction of a modified approach to the sup-
ported decision-making model employed within the health and disability de-
cision-making framework. The analysis in this paper supports the introduction 
of the supported decision-making approach in the process of making advance 
directives. As illustrated in the case above, KH could have created effective ADs 
using the supported decision-making approach while she was mentally com-
petent. This approach coheres with the principle of self-determination and 
respect to bodily integrity. It is intended to assist a person in exercising a pref-
erence consistent with the person’s autonomy. Being supported in the process 
of making an advance directive strengthened the person’s autonomy, rather 
than being an undermining factor. This concept, as demonstrated above, can 
be extended to the context of AD. It can assist people who are in the process of 
making ADs in anticipation of future incapacity. Supported decision-making is 
most effective when applied in the process of making ADs, where there exists 
the chance to discuss, document and confirm the person’s wishes as well as en-
suring the person has the mental capacity to understand the nature and conse-
quences of the refusal. Additionally, the approach can help accommodate the 
eventuality of potential subsequent changes by introducing some measures at 
the time the AD is made. While the person is discussing the AD with the doctor, 
it is important to emphasise the significance of regular review and confirma-
tion of the AD as the person requires or when changes occur that would impact 
the application of the AD.65 The possibility of subsequent changes could be 
raised with the person when they are making the AD.
The supported decision-making process illuminates the decision-making 
process in making ADs, and addresses some of the main obstacles which are 
found in an invalid AD. With appropriate support, the person may be able to 
better appreciate the risks and options involved in refusing treatment, thereby 
increasing the possibility of people contemplating making ADs to be better in-
formed about their preferences and circumstances, arriving at better decisions 
that would be valid and more likely to be binding, compared to an AD that 
has not been made using the proposed approach. The person has the oppor-
tunity to reflect upon and subsequently cater for such eventualities to occur. 
Supported decision-making is an effective mechanism in addressing some of 
the main concerns in ADs, before disputes materialise and thus pre-empts 
questions about the ADs’ validity in the decision-making process.
65   For example, in Re AK (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129 AK’s 
decision to cease ventilation was revalidated several times as the changes in his circum-
stances occurred.
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